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I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, in Florida, interrogating officers were required to cease all
questions other than those to clarify the suspect's wishes pursuant to a
suspect's equivocal invocation of the right to remain silent.' However, after
the Supreme Court of Florida's recent decision in State v. Owen,2 and in
light of the United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Davis,3
that is no longer the case. Now, a suspect in Florida must clearly and
1. See Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 966 (Fla. 1992).
2. 696 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1997).
3. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
1
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unequivocally invoke his right to remain silent.4 Following anything less
than an unambiguous invocation of one's rights, police officers are no longer
required to ask only clarifying questions but rather can proceed with their
interrogation.5
This comment will discuss both the prior and current state of confession
law in Florida. It will also address the impact the Davis decision had on
Owen, as well as the impact Owen will have on the handling of equivocal
invocations of one's rights in Florida. Part II will give some background on
both the constitutional and procedural protections afforded a suspect in
Florida. Part Id will address the factual situation of Owen. Part IV will deal
with the procedural posture of the case. The initial brief of the Appellant
State in Owen will be analyzed in Part V. Part VI will focus on the brief that
the Appellee, Owen, submitted to the Supreme Court of Florida. The
decision of State v. Owen will be discussed in Parts VUBIX; beginning with
the Grimes majority's and continuing with Justice Shaw's concurring
opinion and Justice Kogan's dissent, respectively. Part X will conclude that
the failure to require clarifying questions upon an ambiguous invocation of
one's right to remain silent, coupled with the application of a reasonable
person test, will best serve the State of Florida as a whole.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED FLORIDIAN WITH
RESPECT TO CONFESSION LAW
A. Constitutional Protections
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution
6
afford accused individuals due process of the law. The Fifth Amendment
provides, inter alia, that in a criminal case no individual be compelled to be
a witness against himself.7 The Sixth Amendment affords the accused with,
among other things, the right to the assistance of counsel.s Article I,
Sections 9 and 16 of the Florida Constitution mirror the United States
Constitution's Fifth and Sixth Amendments, respectively. Article I Section 9
provides A[n]o person shall.., be compelled in any criminal matter to be a
witness against himself,"9 much like the Fifth Amendment's right against
4. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 718.
5. Id.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8. Id.
9. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
[Vol. 22:459
2
Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 11
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss1/11
Connolly
self-incrimination. 10  Likewise, Article I Section 16 of the Florida
Constitution reiterates the protection afforded by the Sixth Amendment,
providing "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused... shall have the
right... to be heard in person, by counsel or both .,""
B. Procedural Prophylactic Protections
Federal case law has spawned protections beyond those provided by the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The most
noteworthy of these are the Miranda v. State ofArizona rule 12 and the Edwards
v. State of Arizona rule.13 In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court
decided that in order to honor an accused's Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination, specific guidelines must be followed.14 The court required:
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used
as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of
an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive
effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates
in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to
consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no
questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in
any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may
not question him.
15
In Edwards v. State ofArizona, the Court expanded on the Miranda rule.
In Edwards, the Court held:
[A]dditional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for
counsel; and we now hold that when an accused has invoked his
right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid
waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he
responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if
he has been advised of his rights .... [A]n accused.., having
expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9 and § 16(a), respectively.
12. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
13. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
14. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
15. Id.
1997]
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not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel
has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates
further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the
police.16
Much like the adherence to the principles of the Federal Constitution by
the drafters of the Florida Constitution, Florida courts have reiterated the
procedural rules of both Miranda and Edwards. In Traylor v. State,'7 the
Supreme Court of Florida refers to Miranda and its progeny, holding:
[T]o ensure the voluntariness of confessions, the Self-Incrimination
Clause of Article I, Section 9, Florida Constitution, requires that
prior to custodial interrogation in Florida suspects must be told that
they have a right to remain silent, that anything they say will be
used against them in court, that they have a right to a lawyer's help,
and that if they cannot pay for a lawyer one will be appointed to
help them.
Under Section 9, if the suspect indicates in any manner that he or she
does not want to be interrogated, interrogation must not begin or, if it has
already begun, must immediately stop. If the suspect indicates in any
manner that he or she wants the help of a lawyer, interrogation must not
begin until a lawyer has been appointed and is present or, if it has already
begun, must immediately stop until a lawyer is present. Once a suspect has
requested the help of a lawyer, no state agent can reinitiate interrogation on
any offense throughout the period of custody unless the lawyer is present,
although the suspect is free to volunteer a statement to police on his or her
own initiative at any time on any subject in the absence of counsel. 18
III. THE FACTUAL SITUATION OF OWEN V STATE
In May 1984, Duane Owen was aVPrehended by the Boca Raton police
and identified as a burglary suspect. Owen was found to have many
outstanding warrants and, while in custody, initiated contact with the Boca
Raton police to expound upon his role in some of the charges he faced;
burglaries, sexual batteries, and murders in both Boca Raton and Delray
Beach.20
16. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 (citations omitted).
17. Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 957.
18. Id. at 965-66 (footnotes omitted).
19. Owen v. State, 560 So. 2d 207, 209 (Fla. 1990).
20. Id.
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Throughout the questioning, Owen was made aware of his rights under
Miranda and specifically renounced his desire for an attorney, but he recIuested
the presence of a familiar Delray police officer, Officer Woods. 1 The
interrogation of Owen was plagued with his confessions of crimes, followed by
a refusal to talk and, ultimately, his initiating contact with the officers to talk
again.22 On about June 18, 1984, Owen contacted police and confessed to
committing a burglary, sexual battery, and murder in Boca Raton on May 29,
1984.23 Owen's confessions revealed that his method of operation in these
crimes was to remove his clothing, burglarize, and usually, after subduing his
victim into an unconscious state, sexually assault the individual.24
On June 21, 1984, Delray Beach police obtained an inked impression of
Owen's footprint in connection with the March 24, 1984 slaying of a fourteen
year old babysitter in Delray. The victim, who was last heard from at about
ten o'clock that evening, was found to have been sexually assaulted and
murdered as a result of multiple stab wounds. 26 Investigators discovered a
bloody footprint at the scene of the murder.27 Delray police presented Owen
with both the inked footprint and the bloody footprint from the crime scene.28
The following is an excerpt of the interrogation between Officer Rick Lincoln
of the Boca Raton police force, Officer Mark Woods of the Delray Beach
Police Department, and Duane Owen:
OFFICER LINCOLN: Cthat I have to know, Duane. A couple
pieces of the puzzle don't fit. How did it come down? Were you
looking at that particular house or just going through the
neighborhood?
THE DEFENDANT [OWEN]: I'd rather not talk about it.
OFFICER WOODS: Why?
OFFICER LINCOLN: Why? You don't have to tell me about the
details if you don't want to if you don't feel comfortable about that.
Was it just a random thing? Or did you have this house picked out.
That's what I'm most curious about. Things happen, Duane. We
can't change them once they're done.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id
24. Owen, 560 So. 2d at 210.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 209.
27. Id. at210.
28. Id.
19971
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THE DEFENDANT [OWEN]: No.29
After further Vuestioning, Owen stated that he had never been at that
house before. The officers then went on to ask Owen some other
questions regarding a bicycle:
THE DEFENDANT [OWEN]: How do you know I even had a
bike? You don't even know that.
OFFICER LINCOLN: You tell me you didn't have a bicycle. See,
you won't lie, Duane. I know you won't lie when you are
confronted with the truth. Now, are you going to tell me you didn't
have a bicycle? I know that much about you now. You play by the
rules. Those rules are important. We all need rules. Now did you
have a bicycle? Of course, you did. Now, where did you put it?
THE DEFENDANT [OWEN]: I don't want to talk about it.
OFFICER LINCOLN: I won't make you tell me something
you're not comfortable in talking about, Duane. But I do want to
know some of the things that shouldn't hurt that much to talk about.
What you did with the bicycle? How long you were outside the
house? Those kinds of things. I know what you're reluctant to talk
about and I won't press you on that.
THE DEFENDANT [OWEN]: I don't see what them kind of
things got to do with it anyway.
OFFICER LINCOLN: It's all part of the crime, Duane.
3 1
Owen initially denied involvement in the March 24 murder, but later
confessed to the crime.32
IV. PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF OWEN V STATE
Duane Eugene Owen was charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced to
death in the Circuit Court of Palm Beach County, for burglary, sexual batte 9,
and the first degree murder of a fourteen-year-old Delray Beach babysitter.
29. Owen, 560 So. 2d at 215 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
30. Answer Brief of Appellee at 55, Owen (No. 85,781); see also State v. Owen, 696
So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1997).
31. Owen, 560 So. 2d at 215-16 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at210.
33. Id. at 209.
[Vol. 22:459
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Owen's conviction was primarily based on statements of a confession given to
police during custodial interrogation.34  Owen appealed his conviction,
contending that the confession was inadmissible due to
"(1)... improper... coercion [by police officers] in violation of his fifth
amendment right to remain silent," and (2) violation of his Miranda rights due
to continued questioning after invocation of his right to end the interrogation.35
The Supreme Court of Florida reversed Owen's conviction, based on his
second contention regarding violation of his Miranda rights, and remanded the
36
case for retrial. The court held that statements made by Owen during
interrogation such as "I'd rather not talk about it" and "I don't want to talk
about it," were "at the least, an equivocal invocation of the Miranda right to
terminate questioning, which could only be clarified. It was error for the
police to urge appellant to continue his statement."
37
Prior to Owen's retrial, the United States Supreme Court decided Davis v.
United States.38 In Davis, the Court held that:
After a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights under Miranda v.
Arizona,... law enforcement officers may continue questioning
until and unless a suspect clearly requests an attorney .... [I]f a
reference is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in
light of the circumstances would have understood only that the
suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, Edwards does not
require that officers stop questioning the suspect.
39
In light of Davis' clarification of Miranda, the State filed a motion in the
Circuit Court of Palm Beach County to reconsider the admissibili of Owen's
confession. 0 The circuit court held the confession inadmissible. ' The State
then sought certiorari review by the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida.
This too, was denied, but the district court certified the following question to
the Supreme Court of Florida:
DO THE PRINCIPLES ANNOUNCED BY THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT IN DAVIS APPLY TO THE
34. Id. at 210.
35. Id.
36. Owen, 560 So. 2d at 211-12; see also State v. Owen, 654 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1995).
37. Owen, 560 So. 2d at 211.
38. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
39. Id. at 452 (citation omitted).
40. Owen, 654 So. 2d at201.
41. Id.
19971
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ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS IN FLORIDA, IN LIGHT
OF TRAYLOR?
42
V. THE APPELLANT STATE URGES THE COURT TO ANSWER THE CERTIFIED
QUESTION IN THE AFFIRMATIVE
The State in its initial brief asked the Supreme Court of Florida to answer
the certified question in the affirmative.43 The State's first contention that the
certified question should have been answered in the affirmative was that
Traylor v. State 44 should not apply to the instant case.45 The State relied on
the fact that Owen was initially decided based on the Florida Supreme Court's
interpretation of the federal Miranda rule, and not on either the United States
or Florida Constitution.46 Therefore, in light of the limitation placed on the
Miranda rule by the United States Supreme Court's finding in Davis, those
findings should be applied to Owen's case.47
Here, the State distinguished Owen from the two cases relied on byS48 4
respondent: Haliburton v. State and Traylor v. State.49 The State contended
that both Haliburton and Traylor dealt with whether the suspects' confessions
were voluntary as required by both the Fifth Amendment and the state
constitution. In both the original trial and on remand from the United States
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Florida in Haliburton held the
defendant's confession to be involuntary due to a violation of state law.51
The State argued that Traylor, too, was distinguishable from Owen
because it also dealt with whether the defendant's confession was voluntary on
52constitutional grounds and thereby admissible. Conversely, Owen'sconfession was considered voluntary and not in violation of the Fifth
42. Id. at 202; see also Owen, 696 So. 2d at 716.
43. Initial Brief of Appellant at 5, State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1997) (No.
85,781).
44. 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992).
45. Initial Brief of Appellant at 6, Owen (No. 85,781).
46. Id. at 4.
47. Id.
48. 476 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1985).
49. 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992).
50. Initial Brief of Appellant at 7, Owen (No. 85,781).
51. Id. (citing Haliburton v. State, 514 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 1987) and Haliburton v. State,
476 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1985)) (involving a defendant who was not informed prior to questioning
that his sister had hired an attorney who wanted to see him).
52. Id. at 8 (citing Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992)). In Traylor, the court
analyzed the defendant's state rights under Article I, Section 9 of the Florida Constitution and
Federal Constitutional Fifth Amendment rights against self incrimination. Traylor v. State,
596 So. 2d 957, 960 (Fla. 1992).
[Vol. 22:459
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Amendment, but the court found the confession violated Owen's Miranda
rights.53 Here, the State differentiated between cases involving constitutional
violations, like Traylor and Haliburton, and those non constitutional rules
intended to prevent violation of one's Fifth Amendment or state constitutional
right against self-incrimination, such as Miranda. The State emphasized that
Miranda warnings function to prevent coercion but are not protected by the
Constitution.54  The State reiterated that pursuant to Davis, the Traylor
rationale is inapplicable to the admissability of Owen's confession which
involved a violation of Miranda rights.55  To bolster recognition of the
distinction drawn by the State, the appellant referred the court to the similarity
between the instant case and other decisions made by or relied on by this same
court.5 6 Also, the State pointed out instances of where the court refused to
intertwine the violation of a constitutional right rationale with cases involving
the violation of prophylactic rules such as Miranda and Edwards.57
In State v. Craig, 5 the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the issue of
whether the defendant was given adequate Miranda warnings and whether he
had in fact waived his right to counsel.59 The State noted the similarity of the
issue in Craig to the issue in Owen's caseCthe manner in which a defendant
invokes his right to remain silent.60 The State then proceeded to remind the
court of its own rationale in both the instant case and in Craig.61 The court in
these cases noted the distinction between issues of voluntariness of confessions
and issues of proper Miranda warnings and a defendant's invocation or waiver
of his right to remain silent.62 As willing as the court was to differentiate
between such issues, the State emphasized the court's reluctance to apply
63Craig to Haliburton. Here, it seems the State attempted to show that this
53. Initial Brief of Appellant at 7, Owen (No. 85,781).
54. Id at 8 (citing Brown v. State, 565 So. 2d 304, 306 (Fla. 1990); Duckworth v.
Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989); and Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 9.
57. Initial Brief of Appellant at 9, Owen (No. 85,781).
58. 237 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1970).
59. Id. at 738.
60. Initial Brief of Appellant at 9, Owen (No. 85,781).
61. Id.
62. Id. Appellant cited to Owen, where the court stated that "the confession was entirely
voluntary under the fith amendment and that no improper coercion was employed." Owen,
560 So. 2d at 210. Yet, the court went on to add: "Owen next argues that even if the
confession was voluntary under the fifth amendment, it was nevertheless obtained in violation
of the procedural rules of Miranda. On this point, we agree." Id.
63. Haliburton, 476 So. 2d at 194.
1997]
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court's refusal to extend Craig to Haliburton 64 was analogous to theirargument that Traylor should not apply to Owen since Traylor and Haliburton
function as issues based on constitutional law and Owen and Craig were based
on federal rules of procedure.
65
The State further noted that the court, in first finding Owen's confessionto be inadmissible, relied Asolely on federal authority 6  in determining that
only clarifyinuestions may follow an ambiguous invocation of one's right to
remain silent. The State referred to the court's reliance in Owen on previous
interpretations of the Edwards rule.re The court specifically followed and
cited Long v. State69 which interpreted Edwards as requiring all questioning,
other than questions to clarify the defendant's eqtuivocal response, cease even
after an equivocal invocation of Miranda rights. Noting that the court felt
bound to apply Long to find Owen's confession inadmissible, the State relied
on Davis' interpretation of the Edwards rule to now compel the court to find
Owen's confession admissible. 71 Appellant State further reasoned that the
court should answer the certified question in the affirmative, stating AUnited
States v. Davis should apply in Florida and in the instant case. 72
64. Initial Brief of Appellant at 9, Owen (No. 85,781). Appellant quoted Haliburton:
The state argues that we should find appellant's waiver valid under our
decision in State v. Craig. We are unpersuaded... as the issues before us in
Craig were the adequacy of the preinterrogation warnings to inform the
defendant of his right to consult with an attorney and have the attorney with
him during interrogation and the manner in which the defendant expressed
his desire to waive counsel
Id. (quoting Haliburton v. State, 476 So. 2d 192, 194 (Fla. 1985)).
65. Initial Brief of Appellant at 9, Owen (No. 85,781).
66. Id. at 10.
67. Id. Petitioner noted that the court was referencing Long v. State, 517 So. 2d 664
(Fla. 1987).
68. Owen, 560 So. 2d at 210.
69. 517 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1988).
70. Initial Brief of Appellant at 10, Owen (No. 85,781). Appellant cited to Long, where
the court held:
We are bound by the United States Supreme Court decisions in Miranda
[and] Edwards... which we conclude mandate suppression of Long's
confession. Without this equivocal request for counsel, we would find this
confession voluntary and admissible. Miranda and Edwards, however,
establish a bright line test that controls this case and requires suppression of
the confession.
Long, 517 So. 2d at 667.
71. Initial Brief of Appellant at 11, Owen (No. 85,781).
72. Id. at 12.
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The State correlated the holding and rationale of the Davis decision in not
expanding the Edwards rule to the reasons why the Supreme Court of Florida
should not expand on its equivalent interpretation of the Edwards rule.73 In
Davis, with regard to the equivocal invocation of one's Miranda rights, the
court held: "[w]e decline to adopt a rule requiring officers to ask clarifying
questions. If the suspect's statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal
request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him. 74
The Court in Davis acknowledged a lack of uniform standards among the
lower courts in applying Edwards to equivocal requests and, with its decision
in that case, attempted to maintain the bright-line standard for police
interrogations.75 The State emphasized the Supreme Court of Florida's prior
announcement of its need for maintaining the bright-line standard as well.
76
The State expounded by illustrating the similarities between Florida courts
adopting the Miranda and Edwards rules almost verbatim pursuant to Article I,
Sections 9 and 16 of the Florida Constitution.77 Summing up, the State noted
that "[i]n light of the fact that Florida and federal courts have been guided by
identical policy considerations, this Court should adopt the rationale and rule
of Davis. In other words, this Court should apply its pre-Edwards analysis in
Craig.
,7 8
A third reason given by the Appellant as to why the certified question
should be answered in the affirmative was that "[tlhe doctrine of law of the
case should not bar application of Davis to the instant case." 79 The doctrine of
the law of the case means "all questions of law which have been decided by
the highest appellate court become the law of the case which, except in
extraordinary circumstances, must be followed in subsequent proceedings,
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1994)). The Davis court
went on to reiterate that decision's effect on the longstanding rules in Miranda and Edwards:
We held in Miranda that a suspect is entitled to the assistance of counsel
during custodial interrogation even though the Constitution does not provide
for such assistance. We held in Edwards that if a suspect invokes the right to
counsel at anytime, the police must immediately cease questioning him until
an attorney is present. But we are unwilling to create a third layer of
prophylaxis to prevent police questioning when a suspect might want a
lawyer.
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462 (1994).
75. Initial Brief of Appellant at 12-13, Owen (No. 85,781) (citing Davis v. United
States, 512 U.S. 452, 462 (1994)).
76. Id. at 14-15 (citing Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 966 (Fla. 1992)).
77. Id. at 15-16.
78. Id. at 17.
79. Id. at 20.
1997]
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both in the lower and appellate courts."80 Exceptions to this doctrine can be
made when "adherence to the rule would result in 'manifest injustice."' 8' In
urging the court to apply Davis in an exception to the law of the case doctrine,
the State equated the case history of Brunner Enterprises, Inc. v. Department
of Revenue with the case history of Owen. While Brunner was on remand,
the United States Supreme Court delivered an opinion that directly
contradicted the state court's decision in Brunner.83 In Brunner, exceptional
circumstances were found, and the law of the case doctrine dispensed with it.?
The State, in an attempt to persuade the court to do the same in the instant
case, emphasized fairness to the State in their pursuit of justice,s' a non
prejudicial effect on the defendant,86 and the chance to remedy the erroneous
interpretation of the federal rule.87 The State even went on to give accolades to
Justice Grimes' dissent and Justice Ehrlich's concurrence in which they reject
the notion that questioning must cease upon an equivocal invocation of
Miranda rights.88
VI. THE APPELLEE OWEN URGES THE COURT TO ANSWER THE CERTIFIED
QUESTION IN THE NEGATIVE
First, Owen argued that the "law of the case" doctrine should not be used
as grounds for altering the previous decision of this court.89 Owen, like the
State, cited to Brunner but distinguished his case from that of Brunner.
90
Owen relied on the court's opinion in Brunner, stating "'no party is entitled as
80. Brunner Enter., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 452 So. 2d 550, 552 (Fla. 1984).
81. Id. at 552-53 (citing Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 177 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1965)).
82. Initial Brief of Appellant at 21, O3wen (No. 85,781).
83. Id. (citing Brunner Enter., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 452 So. 2d 550, 552
(Fla. 1984)). Brunner involved a decision that out-of-state stock sold by a foreign corporation
could be taxed in Florida.
84. Id. (citing Brunner Enter., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 452 So. 2d 550 (Fla.
1984)).
85. Id. The State specifically said, "[p]reclusion of critical inculpatory evidence based
on an erroneous legal ruling would be a manifest injustice and would result in a total
miscarriage ofjustice." Id. at 22.
86. Initial Brief of Appellant at 21, Owen (No. 85,781). The State claimed "[t]he
defendant is in no different circumstance than he was during pendency of the direct appeal."
Id.
87. Id. at 22. Appellant stated: "[t]he continued adherence to a federal rule that does
not even exist does nothing to protect or uphold any state or federal constitutional right. The
doctrine of law of the case should not be used to perpetuate this costly error." Id.
88. Id. (citing Owen v. State, 560 So. 2d 207, 216 (Fla. 1990)).
89. Answer Brief of Appellee at 11, Owen (No. 85,781). Id.
90. Id.
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a matter of right to have the law of the case reconsidered, and a change in the
law of the case should only be made in those situations where strict adherence
to the rule would result in 'manifest injustice.' 91
While practically using the same quote as the State did in their brief,92
Owen urged that the present case is not one of those exceptional situations, as
was Brunner.93 Owen rejected the correlation between Brunner and Owen, in
that the intervening decisions by the United States Supreme Court warrant
different results.94  He stated: "[s]pecifically, contrary to the situation in
Brunner, Davis does not alter the law in Florida nor is it clearly applicable to
the facts of this case." 9
5
Owen urged that there were three differences that should make Davis
inapplicable in the present case.96  First, Davis concerned the equivocal
invocation of one's right to counsel, whereas Owen involved the defendant's
right to have questioning cease upon his statement 'I'd rather not talk about
it.' ' 97 Second, the Appellee used dicta from the Davis case9 s to support their
notion that when a defendant's request seems ambiguous, the clarification
approach is best.99 Finally, Owen provided that the established law in Florida
is that once a suspect indicates in any manner that he does not want
questioning to continue, the questioning must cease at once. 1°
The Appellee felt the Davis decision in no way altered the law based on
Article I, Section 9, of the Florida Constitution and, therefore, the law of the
case should not be reconsidered. 101 Ironically, in light of how the Supreme
Court of Florida actually answered the affirmative question posed to them in
the instant case, Owen argued that the only way the law of the case should be
changed was if the court were to conclude: "(1) Davis applies with equal force
91. Id. at 12 (quoting Brunner Enter., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 452 So. 2d 550,
552-53 (Fla. 1984) (citations omitted)).
92. See Initial Brief of Appellant at 21, Owen (No. 85,781) where the State said, "[t]he
[S]tate asserts that strict adherence to the erroneous ruling would result in 'manifest
injustice."' Id.
93. Answer Brief of Appellee at 12, Owen (No. 85,781).
94. Id. Appellee referred to Asarco Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307
(1982). Asarco was the case whose decision directly contradicted the outcome of Brunner,
while Davis is the related case decided prior to Owen's retrial.
95. Answer Brief of Appellee at 12, Owen (No. 85,781).
96. Id. at 13.
97. Id.
98. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994). The Courtt said that often
clarifying questions will be good police practice in determining whether a right to counsel is
being invoked. Id.
99. Answer Brief of Appellee at 14, Owen (No. 85,781).
100. Id. at 15. Appellee was referring to Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992).
101. Answer Brief of Appellee at 15, Owen (No. 85,781).
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to the right to remain silent and to terminate questioning; (2) the statements
'I'd rather not talk about it.' and 'I don't want to talk about it.' are equivocal;
[ad]s(3 the Florida Constitution should be interpreted consistent with
Davis."'
Owen's next argument was one the State chose not to dissect: that
Owen's statements "I'd rather not talk about it" and "I don't want to talk about
it" were only equivocal invocations of his right to remain silent."3 On direct
appeal the court held that Owen's "responses were, at the least, an equivocal
indication of the Miranda right to terminate questioning .,,f0 Appellee
continued on to identify the court's earlier interpretation of an equivocal
response in Long v. State quoting: "[w]hen a person expresses both a desire for
counsel and a desire to continue the interview without counsel, further inquiry
is limited .,,105
Appellee defined Owen's statements as courteous, clear, and unequivocal
expressions of his right to remain silent.10 6  Appellee blasted the further
questioning by Officers Woods and Lincoln as clearly violative of Owen's
Miranda'°7 rights, stating they badgered, cajoled, 108 and "pressed him to
talk. ,"
10 9
Owen referred to Miranda and its progeny' as standing for the essential
principle that the defendant has the right to terminate questioning by indicatin
his right to remain silent in any manner and at any point in the interrogation,
r
and that this right be meticulously upheld by the police 12 On this point,
Appellee concluded Owen's statements were not ambiguous and, since they
dealt with his right to remain silent rather than his right to counsel, Davis
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Owen, 560 So. 2d at 211.
105. Long v. State, 517 So. 2d 644, 667 (Fla. 1987) (citations omitted); see also Answer
Brief of Appellee at 16, Owen (No. 85,781).
106. Answer Brief of Appellee at 17, Owen (No. 85,781). Appellee said "[there is no
part of 'I'd rather not talk about it' that expresses the desire to continue to answer questions"
and "'I don't want to talk about it' is unequivocal." Id.
107. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). In Miranda the Court held the
defendant's right to terminate questioning must be Ascrupulously honored." Id.
108. Answer Brief of Appellee at 17, Owen (No. 85,781).
109. Id. at 16 (quoting Owen v. State, 560 So. 2d 207, 211 (Fla. 1990)).
110. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
111. Id. at 103-04. The Court held that the suspect Acontrol[s] the time at which
questioning occurs, the subjects discussed, and the duration of the interrogation." Id. The
Court also provided that the interrogation must cease when the suspect indicates in any
manner his right to remain silent. Id. at 10 1-02.
112. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, where the Court found the defendant's invocation
of right to cut off questioning must be Ascrupulously honored." Id.
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should not apply and Owen's confession should remain inadmissible." 3
Appellee's last argument importuned the court to uphold their earlier decision
in relying solely on the Florida Constitution as the governing law of the
case.1 4 As stated above, Article I, Section 9 of the Florida Constitution
mirrors the Fifth Amendment provision against self-incrimination. 15 Owen
relied mainly on the court's decision in Traylor v. State, in bolstering his
position that Florida law serves as an independent basis for the court's
decision: 116 "'when called upon to decide matters of fundamental rights,
Florida's state courts are bound under federalist principles to give primacy to
our state constitution and to give independent legal import to every phrase and
clause contained therem.'lT
Next, Appellee focused on the similarities between how this court
decided Haliburton v. State, on remand in light of the United States Supreme
Court's intervening decision in Moran v. Burbine H s and the present case and
its relationship to the United States Supreme Court's Davis' decision. 120 In
Haliburton, the defendant was not told prior to police interrogation that his
family had hired an attorney to represent him, in violation of his rights.' 2'
While pending retrial, the United States Supreme Court decided Moran
holding that questioning is to end only upon the defendant specifically
requesting an attorney.' 2 Just like the instant case, the Supreme Court of
Florida had the opportunity to reconsider the Haliburton decision in light of
Burbine.123 In choosing to rely solely on the Florida Constitution the Supreme
Court of Florida rejected the United States Supreme Court's narrower
interpretation in Burbine, and again held the confession inadmissible as it
violated Article I, Section 9 of the Florida Constitution. 24 Correlating the
decision in Haliburton with the instant case, Appellee urged the court to apply
Florida law and reject Davis' narrow interpretation of a defendant's proper
invocation of his right to remain silent.
25
113. Answer Brief of Appellee at 28, Owen (No. 85,781).
114. Id.
115. Article I, Section 9 of the Florida Constitution provides, "[n]o person shall... be
compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against himself." Id.
116. Answer Brief of Appellee at 29, Owen (No. 85,781).
117. Id. (quoting Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 962 (Fla. 1992)).
118. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
119. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
120. Answer Brief of Appellee at 30, Owen (No. 85,781).
121. Haliburton, 476 So. 2d at 192.
122. Answer Brief of Appellee at 30, Owen (No. 85,781) (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475
U.S. 412 (1986)).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 31.
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VII. JUSTICE GRIMES, WRITING FOR THE MAJORITY OPINION, ANSWERS
THE CERTIFIED QUESTION IN THE AFFIRMATIVE
Justice Grimes and the majority began with a recapitulation of the facts
and procedural posture of Duane Owen's case. 126 The justices emphasized the
case against Owen was primarily based on his confession given to Officers
Lincoln and Woods. 127 They also reiterated the court's finding on direct
appeal, stating that although Owen's confession was voluntary under the Fifth
Amendment, it was nonetheless obtained in violation of his Miranda rights.
28
The major factors of the earlier decision were ambiguous responses given by
Owen to questions1 29 the Supreme Court of Florida characterized as "relatively
insignificant" details of the crime which amounted to "at the least, an
equivocal invocation of the Miranda right to terminate questioning."'
130
Another point the Grimes group highlighted was that the court's earlier
decision was, as the Appellant's brief argued, based solely on a previous
interpretation of federal rule: interrogation, other than clarifying questions,
must cease upon a suspect's equivocal invocation of his Miranda rights.'3 '
This procedure was not followed by Officers Woods and Lincoln in obtaining
the inculpatory statements made by Owen, so the confession was ruled
inadmissible, and the trial court decision reversed because the court was
unable to find admitting the confession to be harmless error. 32 Next, the
majority discussed how the supervening decision in Davis,133 which concerned
equivocal invocation of one's right to counsel, related to the instant case,
which concerned equivocal invocation of one's right to remain silent. 34 As if
in direct response to appellee's brief, 135 the court held that the Davis rule
126. State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715, 717 (Fla. 1997).
127. Id. at 717.
128. Id.
129. See Owen, 560 So. 2d at 215. Owen was asked by Officer Lincoln a number of
times if he had ever been to the house before, to which Owen finally replied "I don't want to
talk about it." Also, Owen was asked if he had been scoping out that particular house to rob
and he responded with "I'd rather not talk about it." Officer Lincoln also asked Owen
questions regarding if he had a bicycle with him the night he committed the crime and where
was the bike now. To that, too, Owen responded with "I don't want to talk about it." Id.
130. Id. at211.
131. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 717.
132. Id.
133. 512 U.S. 452 (1994). In Davis, the Court held, police can continue an
interrogation beyond clarifying questions until the suspect makes a clear and unequivocal
request for counsel. Id.
134. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 717.
135. See Answer Brief of Appellee at 15, Owen (No. 85,781). Appellee made a
statement that in order for Davis to apply to the present case, the court will have to conclude
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applies to a suspect's right to remain silent and determined Owen's confession
to be admissible.
136
In support of their finding, the court cited to two cases from the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals: Coleman v. Singletary137 and Martin v.
Wainwright. 13 In Coleman, the court was faced with a similar issue as in the
present case of whether or not the defendant's confession, after an equivocal
assertion of his right to remain silent was admissible.iY9  Grimes and the
majority quoted the Coleman court which stated: "[b]ecause we are bound to
follow the Supreme Court's holding in Davis, our decisions creating a duty to
clarify a suspect's intent upon an equivocal invocation of counsel are no longer
good law." Next, referring to Martin, the Coleman court expounded:
"[f]urthermore, we have already recognized that the same rule should apply to
a suspect's ambiguous or equivocal references to the right to cut off
questioning as to the right to counsel.''
Grimes and the majority summed up their holding by stating "Davis now
makes it clear that, contrary to our belief at the time, federal law did not
require us to rule Owen's confession inadmissable.' 4a  Additionally, the
majority opinion paralleled the Appellant's brief, in that it acknowledges that
its earlier decisions, including Owen, were validated by the courts previous and
erroneous interpretation of federal law. 143 The opinion, like Ap4pellant's brief,
emphasized the rationale of the court in State v. Craig 4 as being a
predecessor to the notion that Davis should be followed in Owen.14
5
Subsequently, the majority, through Grimes, refuted Appellee's
contention that Traylor v. State dictated a finding that Owen's confession
should be deemed inadmissable, pursuant to Article I, Section 9 of the Florida
Constitution.146  Grimes' group stated that Owen's reliance on the court's
that "Davis applies with equal force to the right to remain silent and to terminate questioning."
Id.
136. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 719.
137. 30 F.3d 1420 (11th Cir. 1994).
138. 770 F.2d 918 (11th Cir. 1985).
139. Coleman, 30 F.3d at 1421.
140. Id. at 1424 (citing Martin v. Wainright, 770 F.2d 918, 924 (11 th Cir. 1985)).
141. Id. The court quoted Martin stating "[w]e see no reason to apply a different rule to
equivocal invocations of the right to cut off questioning." Id.
142. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 718.
143. Id. at 718-19; see also Initial Brief of Appellant at 6-10, Owen (No. 85,781).
144. 237 So. 2d 737, 739-40 (Fla. 1970). In Craig, the court found that an ambiguous
request for a lawyer does not require police to clarify the suspect's wishes. Id. at 740.
145. See Owen, 696 So. 2d at 719; see also Appellant's Brief at 6-10, Owen (No.
85,781).
146. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 719. The court specifically stated, "Traylor does not control
our decision in this case." Id.
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words in Traylor regarding Section 9 that "if the suspect indicates in any
manner that he... does not want to be interrogated, interrogation... must
immediately stop,,14 7 was inapplicable 148 In what seems to be ambiguous and
equivocal in and of itself, the majority claimed Owen "reads a meaning into
these words that we never attributed to them."'149 The majority attempted to
clarify by illustrating, as did Appellants in their brief, that the words "in any
manner mirror the language of Miranda and are therefore not additional
safeguards to the federal law.a'
Additionally, Justice Grimes' majority touched upon the fact that Traylor
involved voluntariness of a confession, rather than invocation of Miranda
rights,' 52 as appellant's brief also argued.' 53 After rejecting Owen's argument
in favor of applying Traylor to the instant case, the majority went on to
acknowledge that though they are authorized to disregard the findings of the
United States Supreme Court in Davis, they were unwilling to do so.54 The
justices were more persuaded by the policy concern of the Court in Davis that
the bright line that officers have been afforded, due to decisions like Miranda
and Edwards, would become dim if equivocal statements by suspects allowed
for questioning to terminate. 55
Again, consistent with issues raised by Appellant in the initial brief, the
majority felt that "[t]o require the police to clarify whether an equivocal
statement is an assertion of one's Miranda rights places too great an
impediment upon society's interest in thwarting crime."' ' h  Next, the majority
tackled the issue of whether the intervening decision in Davis7 provided an
exceptional circumstance to the "doctrine of law of the case." 5  They held
that the doctrine serves as a means for judicial economy, and is not an
indisputable directive, but rather a self-imposed limitation to achieve that
147. Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 966. The court in Traylor referred to the Florida
Constitution, Article I, Section 9.
148. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 719.
149. Id.
150. Id. (quoting from the FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See Initial Brief of Appellant at 7, Owen (No. 85,781).
154. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 719.
155. Id. at718-19.
156. Id. at 719.
157. Id. at 720. The doctrine of the law of the case provides that "all questions of law
which have been decided by the highest appellate court become the law of the case which
must be followed in subsequent proceedings, both in the lower and appellate courts." Brunner,
452 So. 2d 550, 552 (Fla. 1984). Only in exceptional circumstances in which manifest
injustice will result, can the court reconsider and remedy an earlier erroneous ruling which has
become the law of the case. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 720.
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goal. 158 Also, the majority noted that "[ain intervening decision by a higher
court is one of the exceptional situations that this Court will consider when
entertaining a request to modify the law of the case."' 5 9
The majority concluded that in light of the United States Supreme Court
ruling, Davis should be applied as the law of the case in Owen's retrial in order
to prevent a manifest injustice by forcing the State to adhere to the court's
previous erroneous interpretation of the federal law.' However, the majority
did not push the envelope as far as the State may have wanted them to. The
majority recognized the State's preference to forgo the retrial and simply have
both Owen's confession and original convictions reinstated, but refused to
overturn its previous decision for a retrial. 16' By answering the certified
question in the affirmative, the majority summarized that "Owen stands in the
same position as any other defendant who has been charged with murder but
who has not yet been tried.' 62
VIII. SHAW'S CONCURRING OPINION: WHAT IS "CLEARLY?"
Justice Shaw's concurring opinion walked that fine line between
concurrence and dissent. While voicing an agreement with the majority's
holding that now in Florida, pursuant to Davis, a suspect must clearly invoke
his Miranda rights to terminate questioning after a previous voluntary waiver
of that right, Justice Shaw also voiced his dissatisfaction with the majority's
own ambiguity as to what "clearly" means.
163
The discrepancy Justice Shaw had with the majority was that although he
agreed with the Davis standard of one's need to "clearly invoke" the right to
remain silent he felt Florida's standard should include an explanation of what
will be construed as a clear invocation. 64 To support his suggested broadening
of the Davis standard, Justice Shaw used Traylor, the same case the majority
hesitated to apply. He emphasized the federalist principles which illustrate
that a state may exceed the protections afforded to its citizens by the federal
158. Id. (citing Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 177 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1965)).
159. The majority cites both Brunner and Strazzulla in support of this reasoning. Id. at
720 (citing Brunner Enter., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 452 So. 2d 550, 552 (Fla. 1984),
and Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 177 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1965)).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 720.
163. Id. at 721 (Shaw, J., concurring). Justice Shaw specifically stated: "I concur in
the majority opinion, as far as it goes, but write specially to express my view as to what
constitutes a 'clear' invocation of the right to cut off questioning in Florida." Id.
164. Id.
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government in order to better safeguard those individuals.16 He quoted much
of the Traylor decision, specifically focusing on the concept that often times
federal decisions serve as adequate guidelines for state courts, though it is
frequently necessary for the state courts, in order to meet local concerns, to
elaborate on the federal findings. 166 Expressly, Justice Shaw noted the court's
statement in Traylor:
[F]ederal precedent applies equally throughout fifty diverse and
independent states .... [T]he Court oftentimes is simply
unfamiliar with local problems, conditions and
traditions .... [N]o court is... more sensitive or responsive to
the needs of the diverse localities within a state, or the state as a
whole, than that state's own high court. In any given state, the
federal Constitution thus represents the floor for basic freedoms;
the state constitution, the ceiling. 1
67
In Justice Shaw's own words, in order to "comport with federalist
principles,"'168 Florida needs to adopt a standard of what is a "clear"
invocation of one's rights by looking at the totality of the circumstances when
the statement is made by the suspect.169 Due to the diverse cultural makeup of
the region Justice Shaw expressed the concern of adhering to a strict standard
of what is deemed "clear." 70 For the less educated migrant worker, or the
newly emigrated Floridian, "clearly" invoking one's right to remain silent may
be a far cry from the invocation made by the second year Nova law student
who just recently wrote an article on the issue. 17 1 In order to combat this
potential problem, Justice Shaw suggested that Florida adopt a reasonable
person standard in ascertaining whether an invocation of the right to remain
- ,,172
silent was done "clearly. He stated, "[i]n my view, a suspect 'clearly'
invokes the right to cut off questioning when a reasonable person would
165. Id. at 721-22
166. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 721-22.
167. Id. at 721 (quoting Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 961-62 (Fla. 1992)).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 721-22. Justice Shaw emphasized that much of Florida's population consists
of non-English speaking immigrants from the surrounding countries and islands, who are
often poorly educated. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 721-22.
171. Id. at 722. Shaw offered the example that "to require a migrant worker with a
limited education and strong regional dialect to 'clearly' invoke his or her constitutional rights
with the same precision and forcefulness as a urologist or a nationally-recognized trial lawyer
is simply unrealistic." Id.
172. Id.
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conclude that the suspect has evinced a desire to stop the interview. All the
circumstances surrounding the statementCincluding the suspects schooling,
command of English, and ethnic backgroundCshould be considered."' 173
In a somewhat haphazard way, Justice Shaw threw in a brief statement
about the equivocal nature of Owen's statements. Citing to the court's
conclusion that Owen's "responses were, at the least, an equivocal invocation
of the Miranda right to terminate questioning." 174 Justice Shaw fashioned his
own depiction of equivocal statements. He created a spectrum where
statements rank from "no invocation" of rights having been made to "an
equivocal invocation" having been made, and finally "a clear invocation"
having been made. 175 He categorized Owen's statements as lying between
equivocal and clear and used that assessment in his agreement with the
majority, stating, "I agree that under these circumstances this case must be
remanded for reconsideration under the Davis standard. 176  His analysis,
stretching the meaning of the word, of Owen's statements ended there. He
seemed to just accept the court's previous determination that Owen's
statements were equivocal, and therefore deemed Davis applicable. Justice
Shaw summarized his opinion by reemphasizing his agreement with the
majority that Davis should be followed, but cautioned the majority that
"without further elucidation this standard is in danger of being used as a 'one
glove fits all' criterion.' 77
IX. JUSTICE KOGAN'S DISSENT STATING THAT HE WOULD ANSWER THE
CERTIFIED QUESTION IN THE NEGATIVE
Chief Justice Kogan, in his dissent, forcefully rejected the majority's
adoption of Davis and what he referred to as the "threshold standard of clarity"
approach.17 8 Particularly, he supported the retainment of what he called "the
clarification" approach, which requires only questions to clarify the suspects
wishes after an ambiguous statement to remain silent or a request for an
attorney is made by that individual. 179 Justice Kogan portrayed the benefits of
applying the clarification approach, rather that the threshold standard of clarity
173. Id.
174. Owen, 560 So. 2d at 211.
175. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 722.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. (Kogan, J., dissenting). In a footnote, Justice Kogan identifies the "'threshold
standard of clarity' approach as one used by federal courts in situations involving ambiguous
invocations of Miranda. The term refers to the notion that one must clearly invoke the
Miranda rights in order for questioning to cease. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 722 n.9.
179. Id. at 722-23.
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approach, as being threefold. Kogan argued that the clarification approach,
rather than the Davis threshold standard of clarity approach, provides officers
involved in an interrogation setting with a more workable guideline.180  He
refuted the Grimes' majority opinion that the Davis rationale preserves the
bright line rule.' 81
Justice Kogan, like Justice Shaw, expressed a grave concern over
allowing individual officers to determine whether a right has been "clearly"
invoked by the suspect. 182  Acknowledging Shaw's concurrence, Kogan
referred as well to the difficulties likely to face interrogating officers, due to
183the diverse educational and cultural background of Florida residents. In
addition, Kogan referred to "[o]ther factors such as a suspect's physical
condition, level of intimidation, level of fear, or lack of linguistic ability
[which will] also make the task of identifying a clear invocation of Miranda
rights a difficult one."
i 4
Justice Kogan's rationale mirrored and often directly quoted from Justice
Souter's concurring opinion in Davis. He suggested that in order to eliminate
the guesswork associated with determining which invocations are clear and
which are not, Florida courts should simply continue to follow the clarification
approach. 8 5  Another advantage Kogan saw in retaining the clarification
approach was the consistency it would afford both in situations where the
suspect initially invokes his right to remain silent and in situations where the
invocation is pursuant to a previous knowing and intelligent waiver of that
right.186 Again citing to Souter's concurring opinion, Kogan said, "applying a
single approach is consistent with Miranda's promise of a 'continuous'
opportunity to exercise one's Miranda rights.' 87
Besides setting better guidelines for police, Justice Kogan felt the
clarification approach served both society's interest in minimizing crime and
the interest of the accused individual.188 In support of his contention that the
clarification approach has sufficiently dealt with Florida's fight on crime,
180. Id.
181. Id. at 723. Kogan referred to the majority opinion citing to Davis creating "a
bright line that can be applied by officers in the real world of investigation and interrogation
without unduly hampering the gathering of information." Davis v. United States, 512 U.S.
452, 453 (1994).
182. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 723.
183. Id. at 724.
184. Id. at 723.
185. Id. Kogan, borrowing from the concept announced by Justice Souter in his
concurring opinion in Davis, specifically said "the 'clarification' approach puts this judgment
call into the hands of the party that is most competent to make itCthe individual suspect." Id.
186. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 723.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 723-24.
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Justice Kogan again cited to Justice Souter's concurrence in Davis where he
said:
[T]he margin of difference between the clarification
approach ... and the one the Court adopts is defined by the class of
cases in which a suspect, if asked, would make it plain that he
meant to request counsel .... While these lost confessions do
extract a real price from society, it is one that Miranda itself
determined should be borne.
189
Justice Kogan, in agreement with Justice Souter, did not see the clarification
approach as an impediment to effective interrogation techniques. Moreover,
Justice Kogan denounced the threshold standard of clarity approach as often
disregarding the rights of the accused.' 90 While he specifically criticized the
Davis majority's opinion on this issue, Justice Kogan simultaneously rejected
the Grimes majority's adoption of such an analysis. T9 He found two particular
faults with the Davis rationale.
First, from Kogan's viewpoint, the Davis majority, while acknowledging
that suspects in a custodial interrogation setting may often be effected by such
elements as intimidation, a limited grasp of the language, and linguistic skills,
wrongfully dispelled these factors as acceptable risks "in light of the
protections already afforded these suspects by the Miranda warnings."'
192
Justice Kogan began his analysis by claiming that he found two faults with that
rationale, but he actually went on with criticism quoted from Justice Souter. 93
In essence Justice Kogan, through Justice Souter, expressed his disfavor with
employing a heightened level of communication necessary to invoke the rights
of the accused when these individuals often struggle with language barriers,
lack of education, and fear and intimidation brought on by the sometimes
overwhelming setting of a police interrogation. 194  On this, Justice Kogan
concluded "Davis and the majority in the instant case place a hurdle in front of
those individuals who are the most likely to have difficulty surmounting that
189. Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 453 (1994) (Souter, J.,
concurring)).
190. Id. at 724. Kogan stated that "[i]n my opinion, the 'threshold standard of clarity'
approach does not adequately account for [the rights of the accused] and consequently tips the
scale in favor of law enforcement interests." Owen, 696 So. 2d at 724.
191. Id.
192. Id (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994)).
193. Id.
194. Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 469-70 (1994) (Souter, J.,
concurring)).
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hurdle and successfully invoking their rights."'195 In response to this problem,
he advocated continuing to require officers to ask clarifying questions after an
ambiguous invocation of one's rights.
196
Second, Justice Kogan faulted the Davis majority's finding and the
majority's following of the notion that simply the reading of one's Miranda
rights compensated for any hardships bestowed on the accused by applying the
threshold standard of clarity approach. 197 He, again using Souter's words from
Davis, feared that once a suspect's initial, perhaps, ambiguous request is
ignored by police, the suspect will be hesitant to assert another request be it
equivocal or unequivocal, thinking his next plea will also fall on deaf ears.
198
Kogan reemphasized his feelings that the clarification approach is best suited
to address the needs of the police, society, and the accused.199
Justice Kogan finalized his opinion with disdain for the majority's refusal
to apply the clarification approach and reaffnrn Owen based on the authority
bestowed on them by the Florida Constitution.200  Specifically, Kogan
disagreed with the majority's opinion that their decisions following State v.
Craig201 were based on federal rulings such as Mosley and Edwards, and that
those federal cases were the primary reasons for the shift from the threshold
standard of clarity approach to the clarification approach.20 2 Justice Kogan
said, "any change that might have occurred in the Florida law on this issue
subsequent to Craig was not solely the result of decisions from the United
States Supreme Court. It is my belief that article I, section 9 of our state
constitution played a significant part in resolving this issue."
203
In sum, Justice Kogan would have answered the certified question in the
negative, since he felt the clarification approach is the best approach to use in
Florida and, much like the Appellee in his brief that the Florida Constitution
serves as an independent basis to reaffirm Owen. 
°4
195. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 724.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. This is a paraphrasing of Justice Souter's argument from Davis, where he said
"in contravention of the 'rights' just read to him by his interrogator, he may well see further
objection as futile." Davis, 512 U.S. at 472-73 (1994).
199. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 724.
200. Id. at 725.
201. 237 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1970). In Craig, the court refused to apply the clarification
approach. Id.
202. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 725.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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X. CONCLUSION
Pursuant to a suspect's equivocal invocation of the right to remain silent,
interrogating police officers in Florida are no longer required to ask clarifying
questions.20 The key to the majority's decision in Owen, as well as in Davis,
seems to be the word "required." Both courts acknowledged that clarifying
one's wishes upon an ambiguous statement to possibly assert Miranda rights
will often be good police practice.20 6 Consequently, in Florida, clarification is
not mandatory in such a situation, although it still seems to be preferred. In
this day and age where the "get tough on crime" attitude is so prevalent, the
majority's decision to give police more leeway in interrogations seems
appropriate.
Justices Shaw and Kogan voiced concerns with the difficulty in applying
the clearly invoke standard in such a diverse community that exists throughout
Florida. They seem to worry that the uneducated migrant workers cry of, "No
quiero hablar,"207 will be ignored. Justice Shaw, however, fashioned an
adequate solution to the problems that may be faced due to language and
educational barriers. His suggestion of applying a reasonable person test is a
commendable one. In a society as diverse as Florida, it is likely the police
force will reflect the surrounding community, at least making the language
barrier not such an obstacle with which to contend. On the other hand, asking
whether a reasonable person in this situation would find this individual as
invoking his right to remain silent provides a test that will help overcome
educational and other barriers. The key to Shaw's approach being effective is
that for all surrounding circumstances to be accounted for when assessing
whether Miranda rights have been asserted. The adoption of what Kogan
referred to as the "threshold standard of clarity" approach coupled with Shaw's
subjective reasonable person test will provide the necessary protections for
Florida's criminal suspects, the police, and society at large.
Beth Connolly
205. Id.
206. Id.; see also Davis, 512 U.S. at 452.
207. "I don't want to talk" in Spanish.
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